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SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW
William H. Hurd *
Stephen C. Piepgrass **
I. INTRODUCTION
The year 2010 marks the thirty-fifth anniversary of the enact-
ment by Congress of the Education for All Handicapped Children
Act,' a law designed "to end the long history of segregation and
exclusion of children with disabilities from the American public
school system. ' 2 In the ensuing years, that law has been
amended, improved, and renamed.3 Since 1990, the law has been
known as the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
("IDEA"), and it forms the foundation of special education law in
the United States.4
The IDEA provides states with federal funds for special educa-
tion, and in return, states are required to "ensure that all child-
ren with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate
public education ["FAPE"I that emphasizes special education and
related services designed to meet their unique needs and prepare
them for further education, employment, and independent liv-
* Partner, Troutman Sanders, LLP, Richmond, Virginia; Adjunct Professor of Law,
George Mason School of Law. J.D., 1977, University of Virginia School of Law; B.A., 1973,
University of Virginia. William H. Hurd is a former Solicitor General of Virginia and a
former Deputy Attorney General for Health, Education, and Social Services.
** Associate, Troutman Sanders, LLP, Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2005, University of
Virginia School of Law; A.B., 1999, Duke University.
One or more of the authors, together with other counsel at Troutman Sanders, pro-
vided representation to the parents in several of the cases discussed in this article, includ-
ing Schaffer v. Weast, Hogan v. Fairfax County School Board, M.S. v. Fairfax County
School Board, and County School Board v. RT.
1. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, 89 Stat.
773 (1975) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006)).
2. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, BACK TO SCHOOL ON CIVIL RIGHTS 16 (2000),
available at http://www.ncd.gov/newsroom/publications/2000/backtoschooll.htm.
3. See THOMAS F. GUERNSEY & KATHE KLARE, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW 3-5 (3d ed.
2008).
4. See generally 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (2006).
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ing."5 In addition, the IDEA makes school systems individually
accountable to the parents of children with disabilities. 6 Instead
of allowing school systems to decide unilaterally the educational
program a child will receive, the IDEA gives parents an equal
seat at the table in developing their child's Individual Education
Program ("IEP").7
The IEP is the "primary vehicle" and "centerpiece of the
[IDEA's] education delivery system."" It is a written document
developed by an "IEP team" that includes, among others, the
child's parents, teacher, and local school system representatives. 9
The IEP must explain "how the child's disability affects his in-
volvement and progress in the general education curriculum."'1 It
also must set annual goals and explain how progress toward
those goals will be evaluated, and must include a statement of
services and accommodations that the school system will provide
to the child.11
If the school system and parents cannot agree on the IEP, or if
other disputes arise, the parents have the right to challenge the
school system through an "impartial due process hearing.' 12
Moreover, a party who is dissatisfied with the results of the due
process hearing may seek judicial review in either federal district
court or in a state court of competent jurisdiction. 13
Such a complex system for resolving educational disputes must
inevitably give rise to significant procedural and substantive is-
sues. Surprisingly, some of the issues that seem most obvious
were not definitively addressed-at least not in Virginia-until
relatively recently. This article will focus on several of those is-
sues and examine how the United States Supreme Court, the
Fourth Circuit, and, in some cases, federal district courts and
hearing officers have resolved them in the years since 2005.
Among the issues recently decided and discussed in this article
5. Id. § 1400(d)(1)(A).
6. See GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 3, at 10 (citing 20 U.S.C. §§ 1414(c)-(e),
1415(b), 1415(d) (2006); 34 C.F.R. §§ 300.501-300.504 (2009)).
7. Id. (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B)(i) (2006); 34 C.F.R. § 300.306 (2009)).
8. Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 311 (1988).
9. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(B).
10. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(I)(aa).
11. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(II)-(IV).
12. See id. §§ 1415(b)(6), 1415(0.
13. Id. § 1415(i)(2).
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are: (1) whether parents have a right to appear in court without a
lawyer;14 (2) whether parents are entitled to reimbursement for
expert witness fees;15 (3) who must carry the burden of proof;16 (4)
how specific an IEP must be; 7 (5) what happens when parents
win a change in placement at a due process hearing, but the
school system appeals; 8 (6) what rules govern the statute of limi-
tations;19 and (7) when parents may obtain public payment for a
private placement.20
II. Do PARENTS HAVE A RIGHT TO APPEAR IN COURT
WITHOUT A LAWYER? 21
One of the obstacles facing parents in their disputes with
school districts is the cost of hiring legal counsel. It is true that
parents who prevail may receive an award of attorney's fees un-
der the fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA;2 2 however, such an ar-
rangement is no panacea. Parents must either find counsel will-
ing to forego compensation if the case is lost or be willing and able
to pay legal fees out of pocket in the hope of obtaining reim-
bursement months, perhaps years, later. Some parents have at-
tempted to avoid the cost issue by the simple expedient of being
their own advocates, even though they are not trained as law-
yers. 23 Others have sought to avoid reliance on lawyers in the be-
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV.
17. See infra Part V.
18. See infra Part VI.
19. See infra Part VII.
20. See infra Part VIII.
21. See Winkelman v. Parma City Sch. Dist., 550 U.S. 516, 535 (2007) (holding that
parents may appear in court on IDEA claims without counsel).
22. The IDEA provides: "In any action or proceeding brought under this section, the
court, in its discretion, may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs .. . to a
prevailing party who is the parent of a child with a disability . . . ." 20 U.S.C. §
1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I) (2006). In sharp contrast, a school system that prevails may obtain an
award of attorney's fees only under two very narrow circumstances. First, a court may
award attorney's fees against the attorney of a parent if the attorney "files a complaint...
that is frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation," or if the attorney "continued to li-
tigate after the litigation clearly became frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation
.... " Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(II). Second, a court may award attorney's fees against the parent
or his attorney "if the parent's complaint.., was presented for any improper purpose, such
as to harass, to cause unnecessary delay, or to needlessly increase the cost of litigation."
Id. § 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(III).
23. See, e.g., Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 228 (3d Cir. 1998)
(parents proceeding pro se could not afford an attorney nor find one willing to take the
2009]
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lief, mistaken or not, that they would be more effective advocates
than someone who does not know their child nearly so well.24
For parents to appear without counsel has not been particular-
ly controversial with respect to administrative proceedings. 5 In
federal court, however, school systems across the country have
sought to prevent non-attorney parents from moving forward
without obtaining legal counsel .2 The school systems argued that
rights at issue in IDEA litigation belong to the child, not the par-
ent,27 and they invoked the common law rule that non-attorneys
cannot litigate the interests of another. These objections were, in
part, a strategy by which school systems sought to win at the
threshold without any judicial examination into the merits of a
case. Yet, courts also were concerned that allowing laymen to ar-
gue IDEA cases would detract from the quality of representation
and burden courts with the inefficiencies that often characterize
pro se litigation.29
Before the Supreme Court resolved the issue of parental repre-
sentation in Winkelman,3° the Fourth Circuit had not addressed
the issue squarely. Yet, Fourth Circuit precedents were so aligned
as to leave little doubt what the outcome would be if such a case
had come before it. In Doe v. Board of Education, the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that "parents and children are distinct legal entities un-
der the IDEA''31 and that a parent-attorney was representing his
child's interest-not his own-when he appeared in federal court
in an IDEA case2 2 The Fourth Circuit held that because the par-
ent-attorney in Doe was representing the child, he was not sub-
case on a pro bono or contingent fee arrangement).
24. Cf. Erin Phillips, Note, When Parents Aren't Enough: External Advocacy in Special
Education, 117 YALE L.J. 1802, 1806, 1808-09, 1814, 1816 (2008) (acknowledging that
parents are effective representatives of their children's general interests, but arguing that
parents alone are not the best advocates for their children's special education needs).
25. See, e.g., Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 227, 233; Wenger v. Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist.,
146 F.3d 123, 126 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam), overruled on other grounds by Winkelman,
550 U.S. at 518.
26. E.g., Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch. Dist., 409 F.3d 753, 755 (6th Cir. 2005);
Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 228. Contra Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg'l Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247,
248 (1st Cir. 2003).
27. E.g., Maroni, 346 F.3d at 248; see, e.g., Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 235-37.
28. See Cavanaugh, 409 F.3d at 756; Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 232.
29. See Maroni, 346 F.3d at 258 (citing Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 231).
30. Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 535 ("Parents enjoy rights under IDEA; and they are, as a
result, entitled to prosecute IDEA claims on their own behalf.").
31. 165 F.3d 260, 263 (4th Cir. 1998).
32. Id. at 262.
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ject to the rule barring pro se lawyers from an award of attorney's
fees (though it denied such an award on other grounds).3  Of
course, saying that the interests belong to the child rather than
the parent does not necessarily mean that the parent cannot
represent those interests. In a later case, however, the Fourth
Circuit "join[ed] the vast majority of [its] sister circuits in holding
that non-attorney parents generally may not litigate the claims of
their minor children in federal court."34
Among those circuits that had expressly addressed the issue
before Winkelman was decided, there was a split of opinion with
the great weight of authority ruling against parents. The First
Circuit stood alone in allowing parents to represent their child-
ren's substantive claims.35 The Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh, and
Eleventh Circuits prohibited such representation, at least where
the issue before the court involved something other than the pro-
cedural rights and reimbursement demands that the IDEA ex-
pressly vested in parents.3 6 Even before Winkelman, the Sixth
Circuit joined the previous four-circuit majority when it ruled
33. Id. at 262, 264-65; accord Emery v. Roanoke City Sch. Bd., 432 F.3d 294, 299, 300,
300 n.2 (4th Cir. 2005) (holding that a claim for reimbursement of private school costs be-
longed to the parents, not the child, and was barred by statute of limitations notwith-
standing minority tolling rule).
34. Myers v. Loudoun County Pub. Schs., 418 F.3d 395, 401 (4th Cir. 2005) (emphasis
added). Myers involved a pledge of allegiance controversy, not an IDEA dispute; however,
among the circuit decisions cited by Myers were two cases that applied the rule against
parental representation to deny parents the right to represent their children in IDEA cas-
es. See id. at 397, 401 (citing Navin v. Park Ridge Sch. Dist. 64, 270 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th
Cir. 2001) (per curiam); Devine v. Indian River County Sch. Bd., 121 F.3d 576, 581 (11th
Cir. 1997)).
35. Compare Mosely v. Bd. of Educ., 434 F.3d 527, 532 (7th Cir. 2006) (holding a par-
ent could not represent her child in an IDEA claim), Cavanaugh v. Cardinal Local Sch.
Dist., 409 F.3d 753, 756 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding a non-lawyer may not represent his child
in an IDEA claim), Collinsgru v. Palmyra Bd. of Educ., 161 F.3d 225, 227 (3d Cir. 1998)
(holding non-attorney parents cannot represent their children in federal court), Wenger v.
Canastota Cent. Sch. Dist., 146 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 1998) (per curiam) (holding a parent
could not represent his child's interest in court), and Devine, 121 F.3d at 581 (holding the
IDEA does not allow an exception for non-attorneys to represent others' interest), with
Maroni v. Pemi-Baker Reg'l Sch. Dist., 346 F.3d 247, 250 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding parents
were "parties aggrieved" and could sue pro se on both procedural and substantive
grounds).
36. Collinsgru, 161 F.3d at 227; see Wenger, 146 F.3d at 124, 126 (holding a non-
attorney parent was only entitled to represent his own procedural rights under the IDEA,
not his child's); cf Navin, 270 F.3d at 1149 (stating the IDEA grants rights to parents, but
non-lawyer appellant could not represent his son); Devine, 121 F.3d at 582 (holding non-
attorney parents may participate in IDEA due process hearings, but may not represent
their children in federal court proceedings).
2009]
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that "non-lawyer parents may not represent their child in an ac-
tion brought under the IDEA."37 It was this precedent the Sixth
Circuit followed in the Winkelman case, holding in an unreported
decision that the parents of Jacob Winkelman, a child with aut-
ism, could not appear in federal court to argue that the IEP of-
fered by the school system was deficient. 3
Overruling the Sixth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court
held that parents do not appear in IDEA cases as mere guardians
of their children's rights. Instead, "[the IDEA's] text and struc-
ture[ I creates in parents an independent stake not only in the
procedures and costs implicated by [the IDEA] but also in the
substantive decisions to be made."39 As the Court explained, "[the]
IDEA does not differentiate ... between the rights accorded to
children and the rights accorded to parents."40 Given this analy-
sis, the outcome was clear, because "there is no question that a
party may represent his or her own interests in federal court
without the aid of counsel."*' Thus, the Sixth Circuit erred when
it dismissed the Winkelmans' case based on their refusal to ob-
tain legal counsel.42
As a result of the Winkelman decision, parents now have the
right to appear in federal court and advocate for their child's edu-
cation under the IDEA without obtaining legal counsel.43
37. Cavanaugh, 409 F.3d at 756 (citing Navin, 270 F.3d at 1149; Collinsgru, 161 F.3d
at 227; Wenger, 146 F.3d at 124-25; Devine, 121 F.3d at 582).
38. See Winkelman, 550 U.S. at 521 (discussing the Sixth Circuit's order dismissing
the Winkelmans' appeal unless the parents obtained counsel to represent Jacob).
39. Id. at 531 (emphasis added).
40. Id. While the Court was able to base its decision on the IDEA rather than on con-
stitutional principles, it nevertheless noted that its decision was in keeping with "the li-
berty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under
their control.'" Id. at 529 (quoting Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925)).
41. Id. at 522 (emphasis added) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (2000)).
42. Id. at 535. Given the Supreme Court's decision that the parents represent their
own rights in an IDEA case, there was no need to address the Winkelmans' alternative
argument that they could represent their child's rights without legal counsel. Id.
43. While Winkelman did not expressly address whether parents have a similar right
in state court, the general state law rule is that individuals have a right to appear in court
to argue their own cases. Because the Winkelman Court decided that the IDEA grants
rights to parents-not just to their children-parents would seem to have the right to ar-
gue for those rights in state court.
[Vol. 44:17
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III. ARE PARENTS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT FOR THEIR
EXPERT WITNESS FEES?
44
As noted by Peter Wright, a nationally known advocate for
children with disabilities, special education litigation is "a mix-
ture of divorce, medical malpractice and wrongful death cas-
es .... It's a battle of experts, with intense emotions and both
sides feeling betrayed by the other. ''45
Given the need for expert testimony, one might have thought
that Congress would require school systems to reimburse parents'
expert witness fees when the parents prevail, just as it required
school systems to pay the attorney's fees of prevailing parents.41
Indeed, many in Congress probably thought they did exactly that.
In 1986, when Congress amended the IDEA, it did so by a vote
that adopted a Conference Report reconciling two competing ver-
sions of the legislation ("1986 Conference Report").47 That report
discusses the IDEA's authorization for courts to award "attorneys'
fees as part of the costs." As the report explains:
The conferees intend that the term "attorneys' fees as part of the
costs" include reasonable expenses and fees of expert witnesses and
the reasonable costs of any test or evaluation which is found to be
necessary for the preparation of the parent or guardian's case in the
action or proceeding.
4 s
Yet, in Arlington Central, decided by the Supreme Court in 2006,
this argument persuaded only three Justices.4 9 A majority of the
44. See Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 293-94
(2006) (holding that parents who prevail in litigation with school systems under the IDEA
are not entitled to have their expert witness fees reimbursed by the school system).
45. Michael Alison Chandler, Who Speaks Best for Matthew? Legal Fight Over Pay-
ment for Tutoring Fairfax Special-Ed Student Illustrates Growing Trend, WASH. POST,
Aug. 30, 2009, at Cl (emphasis added).
46. See supra note 22.
47. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-687 (1986) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1807.
48. H.R. REP. NO. 99-687, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1807, 1808 (emphasis
added).
49. See 548 U.S. at 308 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissenting). Be-
fore the decision in Arlington Central, there was a split in the circuits, with the Seventh,
Eighth, and District of Columbia Circuits ruling that expert fees were not reimbursable
and the Second Circuit ruling that expert fees were reimbursable. Compare T.D. v. La-
Grange Sch. Dist. No. 102, 349 F.3d 469, 480-82 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that expert fees
are not recoverable), Neosho R-V Sch. Dist. v. Clark ex rel. Clark, 315 F.3d 1022, 1031-33
(8th Cir. 2003) (same), and Goldring v. District of Columbia, 416 F.3d 70, 73-77 (D.C. Cir.
2005) (same), with Murphy v. Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 402 F.3d 332, 335-
39 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that expert fees are recoverable). The Fourth Circuit was pre-
sented with this question on at least two occasions, but the court did not rule on the ques-
20091
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Court held that the fee-shifting provisions of the IDEA do not
"authorize[ ] prevailing parents to recover fees for services ren-
dered by experts in IDEA actions."50 In reaching this decision, the
Court was guided by the fact that the IDEA is Spending Clause
legislation, and thus, any conditions attached by Congress "must
be set out unambiguously."51 Analogizing the IDEA to a "contract"
between the federal and state governments, the Court noted that
states can only be bound by conditions that they accept "volunta-
rily and knowingly."52 Thus, the Court explained:
[We must view the IDEA from the perspective of a state official who
is engaged in the process of deciding whether the State should accept
IDEA funds and the obligations that go with those funds. We must
ask whether such a state official would clearly understand that one
of the obligations of the Act is the obligation to compensate prevail-
ing parents for expert fees.53
Deciding whether states have been given adequate notice of a
condition of federal funding would seem to depend largely on the
particular sources-for example, statutory text, regulations, court
decisions, and legislative history-that state officials are expected
to read and rely upon. In Arlington Central, the majority con-
cluded that reading the statutory text would not give the requi-
site notice because the word "'costs' is a term of art that generally
does not include expert fees." 54 The majority also noted that the
general federal statutes governing what may be taxed as court
costs do not authorize recovery of expert witness fees.5
Also key for the majority were rulings in two non-IDEA cases-
Crawford Fitting v. Gibbons56 and West Virginia University Hos-
pitals, Inc. v. Casey.57 In Crawford Fitting, petitioners urged the
Court to rule that, by giving a district court authority to award
"costs," the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure effectively empo-
wered the district court to circumvent congressional limitations
tion either time because the expert fee issue was rendered moot given the court's disposi-
tion of other issues. See DiBuo ex rel. DiBuo v. Bd. of Educ., 309 F.3d 184, 191-92 (4th Cir.
2002); M.M. ex rel. D.M. v. Sch. Dist., 303 F.3d 523, 538 n.18 (4th Cir. 2002).
50. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 293-94.
51. Id. at 296 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
52. Id. (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 297 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
55. Id. at 297-98 (citing 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821(b), 1920 (2000)).
56. 482 U.S. 437 (1987).
57. 499 U.S. 83 (1991).
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and award expenses not listed among the "costs" identified in 28
U.S.C. §§ 1821 and 1920.58 The Court rejected this argument,
finding the term "costs" as used in Rule 54(d) to be limited by the
statutes. 9 In Arlington Central, the Court compared the argu-
ment it rejected in Crawford Fitting to the argument advanced by
the parents under the IDEA, finding the two "very similar."6
Thus, the parents' argument was rejected, too.
Similarly, in Casey, the Court rejected the argument that 42
U.S.C. § 1988-a fee-shifting statute often used in civil rights
cases-authorizes a court to award prevailing parties their expert
witness fees. 1 In the eyes of the Arlington Central majority, the
Casey decision was especially important because the operative
language found in § 1988 was virtually identical to the operative
language found in the IDEA.62 Thus, in order to rule for the par-
ents, the Court "would have to... hold that the relevant lan-
guage in the IDEA unambiguously means exactly the opposite of
what the nearly identical language in 42 U.S.C. § 1988 was held
to mean in Casey."63 Despite the legislative history suggesting
that Congress may have intended exactly that result, the Court
was unwilling to take this stance.6 4 "[W]here everything other
than the legislative history overwhelmingly suggests that expert
fees may not be recovered, the legislative history is simply not
enough."65
58. Crawford Fitting, 482 U.S. at 441.
59. Id.
60. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 301 (stating that plaintiffs in both cases advanced an
expansive reading of the term "costs" and rejecting both).
61. Casey, 499 U.S. at 102.
62. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 301-02. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2006) (explain-
ing that a court has discretion to award a prevailing party "a reasonable attorney's fee as
part of the costs"), with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a)(i)(3)(B)(i) (2006) ("[Tlhe court, in its discretion,
may award reasonable attorneys' fees as part of the costs .. .
63. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 302.
64. The parents in Arlington Central argued that Casey supported their position be-
cause of a footnote discussing the 1986 Conference Report in terms that seemed to draw a
distinction between the IDEA and § 1988. See id. In that footnote, Casey described the
1986 Conference Report as undermining the argument that costs under § 1988 included
expert fees. 499 U.S. at 91-92 n.5 ("The specification would have been quite unnecessary if
the ordinary meaning of the term ["costs"] included those elements. The statement is an
apparent effort to depart from ordinary meaning and to define a term of art.") (emphasis
added). It was an effort that the Arlington Central majority found unavailing. 548 U.S. at
302.
65. Arlington Cent., 548 U.S. at 304.
2009]
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As the majority explained:
In a Spending Clause case, the key is not what a majority of the
Members of both Houses intend but what the States are clearly told
regarding the conditions that go along with the acceptance of those
funds. Here, in the face of the unambiguous text of the IDEA and the
reasoning in Crawford Fitting and Casey, we cannot say that the leg-
islative history on which respondents rely is sufficient to provide the
requisite fair notice.6"
Although the majority ruled in favor of the school system, it did
not note any disagreement with the dissent's view that "[i]n IDEA
cases, experts are necessary."67 Neither did the majority disagree
with the dissent's observation about the potential impact of the
Court's ruling:
Experts are also expensive .... The costs of experts may not make
much of a dent in a school district's budget, as many of the experts
they use in IDEA proceedings are already on the staff.... But to
parents, the award of costs may matter enormously. Without poten-
tial reimbursement, parents may well lack the services of experts en-
tirely.
68
As a result of this decision, parents will be discouraged from
bringing complaints in cases-even highly meritorious cases-
that they would have otherwise brought had the Arlington Cen-
tral decision come down in their favor. For example, instead of
paying a doctor for time spent testifying about why a child with
autism needs to receive speech/language therapy over the sum-
mer, parents may find it cheaper to simply pay for the services
themselves. Children of low-income parents, who do not have the
money to pay for either the expert or the services, may simply
have to do without needed services if the school system refuses to
provide them. 69
66. Id.
67. See id. at 314 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
68. Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see Peter J. Kuriloff & Steven S. Gold-
berg, Is Mediation a Fair Way to Resolve Special Education Disputes? First Empirical
Findings, 2 HARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 35, 39-40 (1997) (discussing the findings of studies
showing a correlation between the success of parents in challenging a school district's plan
and their capacities to use effective procedures in due process hearings).
69. Such concerns are, of course, a matter for Congress to address. In 2007, legislation
was introduced to add expert witness fees to the list of recoverable costs available to pre-
vailing parents. See H.R. 4188, 110th Cong. (2007). Thus far, however, legislation has not
passed. See Group Sets Special Ed Agenda for New Congress, SPECIAL EDUCATOR (Arling-
ton, Va.), Dec. 5, 2008, at 3.
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IV. WHO HAS THE BURDEN OF PROOF?70
At first blush, allocating the burden of proof may seem relative-
ly unimportant, at least in a civil case where a mere preponder-
ance of evidence carries the day. A party wins by tipping the
scales even slightly in his favor, and only when the evidence is
perfectly balanced-in equipoise-does the burden of proof de-
termine the outcome.' Or so the theory goes. Yet, as a practical
matter, hearing officers and courts do not always balance the evi-
dence on the edge of a razor. Often, a far wider mental fulcrum is
used, and the party bearing the burden will lose unless he can
prove his case more decidedly than the textbook preponderance
standard might seem to require.7 2 It was, perhaps, the recognition
of this practical reality that led child advocates and the public
school lobby to contest so vigorously the allocation of the burden
of proof in Schaffer v. Weast.'
The case arose in Montgomery County, Maryland and involved
the question of whether the student's disability required him to
be placed in small classes in order to learn.7 The parents said he
needed small classes; the school system said he did not.75 Two
years after litigation began, the school system changed its mind,
agreed that the student needed small classes, and wrote a new
IEP that placed him in a public program providing this accommo-
dation. Even so, the school system continued its refusal to pay the
private school costs incurred by the parents in the interim.76
Thus, the lawsuit continued on a long, tortuous path that even-
tually led to the United States Supreme Court.
70. Schaffer ex. rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005) (holding that, in the ab-
sence of any statutory rule allocating the burden of proof, the burden is allocated to the
party seeking relief, typically the parents).
71. See, e.g., id., at 58 (noting that shifting the burden of proof will have little impact
on due process hearing dispositions because very few cases are in "evidentiary equipoise.").
72. See, e.g., Christoph Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence Versus Intime Convic-
tion: A Behavioral Perspective on a Conflict Between American and Continental European
Law, 33 VT. L. REV. 435, 456-57 (2009) (discussing the polarizing effect of coherence shifts
on jury deliberations and the resulting tendency of jurors to overvalue some evidence and
undervalue other evidence).
73. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 54-55.
74. Id. The student was classified as "learning disabled, language-impaired and other
health impaired." Brief of Petitioners at 8, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49
(2005) (No. 04-698).
75. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 54-55.
76. Id. at 55.
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In a 1998 due process hearing, the Administrative Law Judge
("ALJ") found the evidence to be in equipoise and, placing the
burden of proof on the parents (who had sought the hearing),
ruled in favor of the school system.7 The parents sought federal
court review, and in 2000 the district court reversed the ALJ on
the burden of proof issue, placed the burden on the school system,
and remanded the case for further proceedings.78 With the burden
of proof placed on the school system, the ALJ reaffirmed his view
that the evidence was in equipoise and ruled for the parents on
the merits-holding that the IEP proposed by the school district
was inappropriate and that the program favored by the parents
was appropriate.7 9
Meanwhile, the school system had appealed the district court's
decision to the Fourth Circuit.8 1 In 2001, without deciding the
burden of proof issue, the court of appeals vacated the district
court's 2000 decision and remanded the case for further proceed-
ings, including an appeal from the ALJ's second decision on the
merits.8 1
In 2002, the district court again placed the burden of proof on
the school system, and it affirmed the ALJ's 2000 ruling for the
parents on the merits . 2 The school system again appealed and, in
2004, a divided court of appeals reversed the district court on the
burden of proof issue and once again imposed the burden on the
parents. 3
The Fourth Circuit's decision added to an already well-
developed split among the circuits. Four circuits-the Fourth,
Fifth, Sixth, and Tenth-placed the burden of proof on the par-
ents,8 4 while seven circuits-the First, Second, Third, Seventh,
Eighth, Ninth, and the District of Columbia-placed the burden
77. Id.
78. Brian S. v. Vance, 86 F. Supp. 2d 538, 545 (D. Md. 2000).
79. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 55.
80. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Vance, 2 Fed. App'x 232, 233 (4th Cir. 2001) (per cu-
riam).
81. Schaffer, 2 Fed. App'x at 233.
82. Weast v. Schaffer, 240 F. Supp. 2d 396, 348, 402 (D. Md. 2002).
83. Weast v. Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer, 377 F.3d 449, 450 (4th Cir. 2004).
84. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Educ., 790 F.2d 1153, 1158 (5th
Cir. 1986); Tatro v. Texas, 703 F.2d 823, 830 (5th Cir. 1983), affd in part and rev'd in part
sub nom. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 888 (1984); Doe ex rel. Doe v. Bd.
of Educ., 9 F.3d 455, 458 (6th Cir. 1993); Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4,
921 F.2d 1022, 1026 (10th Cir. 1990).
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of proof on the school system.85 In order to resolve the split, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Both sides of the case drew strong amicus support, with Virgin-
ia interests being divided. Among the amici supporting the par-
ents were a large number of disability rights groups,86 as well as a
group of nine states led by Virginia, appearing through its attor-
ney general. 87 Among the amici supporting the school system were
the National School Boards Association, the National Education
Association, a group of state school board associations led by the
Virginia School Board Association, a group of three states (and
one territory) led by Hawaii, and the United States, represented
by the U.S. Solicitor General. 8 This involvement by the United
States was somewhat odd because, when the case was first before
the Fourth Circuit in 2001, the United States had appeared on
the side of the parents. 9
The Supreme Court decided that, at least in the absence of a
different state law rule, "[tihe burden of proof in an administra-
tive hearing challenging an IEP is properly placed upon the party
seeking relief."90 It is, of course, typically the parents who seek
85. L.T. ex rel. N.B. v. Warwick Sch. Comm., 361 F.3d 80, 82 n.1 (1st Cir. 2004) (dic-
tum); Walczak v. Fla. Union Free Sch. Dist., 142 F.3d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1998); Carlisle
Area Sch. Dist. v. Bess P. ex rel. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 533 (3d Cir. 1995); Oberti ex rel.
Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1219 (3d Cir. 1993); Susan and Tom B. ex rel. Beth
B. v. Van Clay, 282 F.3d 493, 496 (7th Cir. 2002) (dictum); Blackmon ex rel. Blackmon v.
Springfield R-XII Sch. Dist., 198 F.3d 648, 658 (8th Cir. 1999); E.S. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No.
196, 135 F.3d 566, 569 (8th Cir. 1998); Clyde K. ex rel. Ryan K. v. Puyallup Sch. Dist. No.
3, 35 F.3d 1396, 1398 (9th Cir. 1994); McKenzie v. Smith ex rel. Smith, 771 F.2d 1527,
1532 (D.C. Cir. 1985). McKenzie may be better viewed as the result of regulatory com-
pliance rather than a judicial allocation of the burden of proof. Id.
86. Brief for the ARC of the United States et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petition-
ers, Schaffer ex rel. Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49 (2005) (No. 04-698); Brief of Amici Cu-
riae Council of Patent Attorneys and Advocates et al. Supporting Petitioners, Schaffer, 546
U.S. 49 (No. 04-698).
87. Brief of the Commonwealth of Virginia and Eight Other States as Amici Curiae in
support of the Petitioners, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (No. 04-698).
88. See Brief of the Council of the Great City School et al. as Amici Curiae in Support
of Respondent, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (No. 04-698); Brief Amici Curiae of the States of Ha-
waii et al. in Support of Respondents, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (No. 04-698); Brief of Amicus
Curiae National School Boards Association in Support of Respondents, Schaffer, 546 U.S.
49 (No. 04-698); Brief of Virginia School Boards Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of Respondents, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (No. 04-698); Brief of the United States as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Respondent, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (No. 04-698).
89. See Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees, Schaffer ex
rel. Schaffer v. Vance, 2 F. App'x 232 (4th Cir. 2001) (No. 00-1471).
90. Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62.
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such relief.91 Indeed, a school system is hardly going to challenge
its own IEP, and it can typically have its way without litigation
merely by withholding the services at issue.92 Even so, as the Na-
tional School Boards Association has pointed out, school systems
sometimes seek a due process hearing "where, for instance, the
district wishes to resolve the appropriateness of a public place-
ment proposal in the face of the unilateral withdrawal of a child
by its parents from public school and placement in a private
school. ''93 Presumably, under the Schaffer decision, the school sys-
tem would have the burden in such a case.
On a collateral matter, the parents and several states asked
the Court to make it clear that states always have the option to
put the burden of proof on their school system regardless of which
side seeks the hearing?4 Although the Court declined to resolve
this issue, 95 it is hard to imagine that such a state law would be
invalid. After all, school systems are creatures of the states and,
if the states wish them to bear a heavier burden than federal law
requires, it would seem to be within the states' prerogative to do
so.96
Since the decision in Schaffer, at least two states-New York
and New Jersey-have enacted legislation placing the burden of
proof on school systems.97 The District of Columbia moved in the
opposite direction, repealing its pre-Schaffer law that placed the
burden of proof on its school system.9 In Virginia, legislation
91. Id. at 53-54 (citing Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 7, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (No.
04-698)).
92. Allan G. Osborne, Jr., & Charles J. Russo, The Burden of Proof in Special Educa-
tion Hearings: Schaffer v. Weast, 200 ED. L. REP. (West) 1, 10 (2005).
93. Brief of Amicus Curiae National School Board Association in Support of Respon-
dents at 5 n.3, Schaffer, 546 U.S. 49 (No. 04-698) (citing Krista P. v. Manhattan Sch. Dist.
212 F. Supp. 2d 873 (N.D. Ill. 2003); Yates v. Charles County Bd. of Educ., 212 F. Supp. 2d
470 (D. Md. 2002)).
94. Schaffer, 516 U.S. at 61.
95. Id. at 61-62.
96. See, e.g., Gill ex rel. Gill v. Columbia 93 Sch. Dist., 217 F.3d 1027, 1035 (8th Cir.
2000) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1981) (holding that
the State may afford parents more rights and impose more duties on the school system
than required by the IDEA)); Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 4, 921 F. 2d
1022, 1029 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond ex rel. Diamond, 808 F.2d 987,
992 (3d Cir. 1986); David D. v. Dartmouth Sch. Comm., 775 F.2d 411, 417, 420 (1st Cir.
1985)).
97. Christina A. Samuels, Some States Shift IEP Burden of Proof to School Districts,
EDUCATION WEEK, Jan. 30, 2008, at 1, 13.
98. Id. at 13. In addition, several other states have placed the burden of proof on the
[Vol. 44:17
SPECIAL EDUCATION
placing the "burden of persuasion" on school systems in due
process hearings was introduced in 2006, but died in committee. 99
The burden of proof in a typical due process hearing is now
clearly decided. When the parents pursue a hearing to challenge
an IEP for a particular year, they will have the burden.100 But
some issues still remain. Suppose, for example, that the parents
rejected the IEPs proposed by the school system for two years in a
row, but, for strategic reasons, they challenge only the first year.
The school system may want the adequacy of the other IEP de-
cided as well, perhaps for its own strategic reasons or just to put
the entire dispute behind it. If the school system successfully per-
suades the hearing officer to address the second IEP, which side
should bear the burden of proof on that issue? There is no govern-
ing precedent on that point. However, the parents would have a
strong argument under Schaffer that the school system would
have the burden since it became "the party seeking relief' with
respect to the second year.
V. How SPECIFIC MUST AN IEP BE?' 0'
In drafting IEPs, school systems sometimes omit details that
parents want to see included."12 For example, an IEP may state
that the child will receive speech/language therapy but fail to
state how often those services will be provided. The school system
may contend that such an approach is educationally sound be-
cause it allows educators to increase or decrease the amount of
therapy provided throughout the year, according to their profes-
sional assessments of the child's changing needs. 1 3 On the other
school systems since Schaffer. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 3140 (Repl. Vol. 2007);
MINN. STAT. § 125A.091(16) (West 2008).
99. S.B. 241, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 2006).
100. See Schaffer, 546 U.S. at 62.
101. An IEP lacking the requisite specificity may be deemed inadequate to provide a
child with an FAPE. See, e.g., A.K. ex rel. J.K. v. Alexandria City Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 672,
682 (4th Cir. 2007) (holding that school system denied FAPE because it failed to identify
which school the child would attend under proposed IEP); M.S. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd.,
No. 1:05cv1476, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at *39 (E.D. Va. May 8, 2007) (holding that
a school system denied FAPE because it failed to specify the amount of one-on-one instruc-
tion the child would receive, when such instruction was found essential to a basic floor of
opportunity).
102. See, e.g., A.K., 484 F.3d at 676 (noting the IEP failed to identify which school the
student would attend).
103. See, e.g., M.S., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *35-36 (summarizing the school's argu-
ment for a flexible and less defined IEP approach based on the student's changing needs).
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hand, parents may argue that the IDEA forbids school systems
from making such important educational decisions unilaterally.0 4
Moreover, vesting the school system with such discretion means
that there will be no objective standard by which to judge the
adequacy of the IEP or the school's compliance with its terms.
Both sides may have a point. The IDEA is very specific in iden-
tifying the content that an IEP must include. It must contain for
example, "a statement of the special education and related servic-
es" as well as the "program modifications" that will be provided to
the child. °5 The IEP must also include "the anticipated frequency,
location and duration of... services and modifications."' Yet, it
surely would be an unreasonable interpretation of the statute to
argue that an IEP must contain all the details of a child's special
education program, down to specific homework assignments and
test questions. 10 7 Somewhere along the way, a line must be drawn.
Two recent decisions from Virginia have sought to draw such a
line by indicating how much specificity an IEP must contain. The
first decision, A.K. ex rel. J.K. v. Alexandria City School Board,
deals with the naming of a particular school that a child will at-
tend under the IEP. 1°0 The second, M.S. v. Fairfax County School
Board, deals with the amount of one-on-one services a child will
receive. 109
When the school system agrees that the child needs to be
placed in a private school, its IEP team members are sometimes
reluctant to specify which private school will be selected. In part,
this may be because IEP team members do not always know
whether a particular private school will be willing to accept the
child. Yet, such a concern would not keep the IEP team from
making a contingent decision or stating a preference. There is of-
104. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(3) (2006) (requiring a parent to receive written notice be-
fore a change or refusal to change an ]EP is implemented by the school).
105. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(IV).
106. Id. § 1414(d)(1)(A)(i)(VII).
107. See Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley ex rel. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 198 (1981) (noting that the
state must provide specialized education to disabled children but does not need to maxim-
ize every disabled child's potential).
108. See A.K. ex rel. J.K. v. Alexandria City Sch. Bd., 484 F.3d 672, 682 (4th Cir. 2007)
(holding that a school system denied FAPE because it failed to identify which school the
child would attend under proposed IEP).
109. M.S. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., No. 1:05cv 1476, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at
*39 (E.D. Va. May 8, 2007) (holding that a school system denied a FAPE because it failed
to specify the amount of one-on-one instruction the child would receive).
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ten something else afoot. By instructing their IEP team members
not to name a particular school, school administrators are able to
keep tighter rein on a decision having a potentially significant ef-
fect on their budget. 110 Moreover, the IDEA gives parents the
right to challenge IEP decisions they do not like. 1 By keeping the
choice of a school out of the IEP process, school systems may hope
to avoid challenges to their decision making on an issue where
parents are likely to have particularly strong opinions.
In A.K., the child spent his eighth grade year in a private, out-
of-state residential school pursuant to a settlement agreement be-
tween the parents and the Alexandria City Public Schools. 112 In
preparing an IEP for the next school year, the school system an-
nounced that, in its opinion, the child could be educated in a pri-
vate day school." 3 Although school system representatives orally
suggested two possible schools meeting that description, the
mother did not believe that either of them would be appropri-
ate. 114 When the meeting ended, the school system had written
the general placement category "private day school" in the IEP
but failed to name any particular school in that document."'
Based on their objection to a private day school placement, the
parents refused to sign the IEP.16 After further investigation of
the private day schools that had been suggested by the school sys-
tem, the parents requested a due process hearing and sought
reimbursement for another year at the residential school." 7
At the hearing, the parents did not dispute the idea that a pri-
vate day school could, in theory, meet their child's needs.1 8 In-
stead, they argued that the two schools suggested by the school
system were inappropriate, and that the failure to name a partic-
110. Of course, under the IDEA, budgetary concerns are not supposed to enter into de-
cisions about what a child needs for an appropriate education. But theory does not always
match reality. As one court has observed: "Left to its own devices, a school system is likely
to choose the educational option that will help it balance its budget, even if the end result
of the system's indifference to a child's individual potential is a greater expense to society
as a whole." Deal ex rel. Deal v. Hamilton County Bd. of Educ., 392 F.3d 840, 864-65 (6th
Cir. 2004).
111. GUERNSEY & KLARE, supra note 3, at 121-22.
112. AK., 484 F.3d at 676.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 677.
118. Id.
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ular school in the IEP constituted a denial of FAPE." 9 Losing at
the initial hearing and on review in federal district court, the
parents appealed to the Fourth Circuit where they prevailed. 121 In
ruling for the parents, the Fourth Circuit did not address the dis-
trict court's decision that the two suggested schools were both ap-
propriate. Instead, the Fourth Circuit focused on the content of
the IEP, holding that, "because it failed to identify a particular
school" where the child would be placed, "the IEP was not rea-
sonably calculated to enable [the child] to receive educational
benefits."1 21 In other words, the failure to name a school in the
IEP constituted a substantive denial of FAPE as a matter of law.
The case was remanded for further proceedings on the parents'
reimbursement claim. 122
While the decision was a clear victory for A.K.'s parents, the
Fourth Circuit stopped short of extending its holding to every
IEP. Instead, the court emphasized that it was not holding that "a
school district could never offer a FAPE without identifying a par-
ticular location" for the services to be provided. 2 3 Leaving that is-
sue open for another day, the court limited its holding to cases
where "parents express doubt concerning the existence of a par-
ticular school that can satisfactorily provide the level of services
that the IEP describes."124
As a result of A.K, there has been a substantial change in the
way school systems in Virginia write IEPs. After analyzing the
A.K decision, the Virginia Department of Education ("VDOE")
wrote to all local school systems in the Commonwealth, giving
them the following guidance:
[O]ur Department's position is that A.K. applies to both private and
public school sites when the parent expresses skepticism and reserva-
tion or outright refusal, leading to potential dispute. In such cases,
the school division needs to provide a list of anticipated schools, offer
some discussion regarding the advantages or disadvantages of each
school, and clearly identify in the child's IEP an appropriate place-
ment from the range of possibilities.
121
119. Id.
120. Id. at 674.
121. Id. at 681.
122. Id. at 682.
123. Id. (emphasis added).
124. Id. & n.12.
125. VDOE Instructional Memorandum from H. Douglas Cox to LEA Adm'rs of Special
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While school systems still may prefer to omit the name of a par-
ticular school from an IEP, they now do so at the risk of having
that IEP declared inappropriate, regardless of the excellence of
the schools they actually may have had in mind.
In M.S. v. Fairfax County School Board, the issue was whether
the IEP made sufficient provision for one-on-one instruction,
which the evidence established the child needed. 126 The IEPs were
written in such broad terms as to allow one-on-one instruction if
the school later elected to provide it; however, the IEPs did not
expressly require any one-on-one instruction much less specify
the number of hours of such instruction that was to be provided.127
The school system defended this "flexibility" on the theory that
"an opportunity for one-on-one instruction was provided, and it is
the decision of the educators how to best meet the identified
goals.""' The school system argued, for example, that "under the
IEPs, [the child] would receive speech therapy in a group setting
and if a speech clinician 'saw the need to pull him to do some one-
on-one work, she would be able to do that.M129
The court rejected the school system's approach. Noting that
"individualized attention is essential to [this child's] education, "130
the court found that the "flexibility" written into the IEPs by the
school system denied the child a "basic floor of opportunity."1 3' As
the court explained, "a flexible program that may provide some
one-on-one instruction upon an additional determination of need,
as provided by the [IEPs at issue], is insufficient."12
Courts following this precedent could readily invalidate IEPs
that identify a potential service or setting, but do not require it, at
least in cases where the court determines that the service or set-
ting is necessary for FAPE. A similar result could befall IEPs that
purport to require a service or setting but fail to specify the time
devoted to such service or setting. Similarly, IEPs that defer deci-
Educ. (May 7, 2008).
126. No. 1:05cv1476 (JCC), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33735, at *19-20, 22 (E.D. Va. May
8, 2007).
127. Id. at *33.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. Id. at *35.
130. Id.
131. Id. at *36.
132. Id. at *35.
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sion making about a particular service until the school conducts
an evaluation sometime after the IEP start date may also be vul-
nerable.
VI. WHAT HAPPENS WHEN PARENTS WIN A CHANGE OF
PLACEMENT AT A DUE PROCESS HEARING, BUT THE
SCHOOL SYSTEM APPEALS?
13
Under the IDEA, hearing officers are required to decide cases
very quickly.13 Not counting a brief preliminary period used for a
resolution meeting and/or mediation session, no more than forty-
five days may elapse between the time the due process request is
filed and the time a hearing is held and decision rendered. 13 This
requirement for expedited decision making reflects the fact that
delays in providing an appropriate education can be very harmful
to a child, perhaps irreparably so.136
In order to balance the need for quick decision making against
the need for judicial review, the IDEA and its implementing regu-
lations-both federal and state-contain a "stay put" provision
governing a child's placement. 137 Rooted in the text of the IDEA,
this rule has the effect of giving parents the benefit of a favorable
ruling at the hearing officer level, pendente lite, while the school
system appeals. 138 The IDEA states that, "during the pendency of
any proceedings conducted pursuant to this section, unless the
State or local educational agency and the parents otherwise agree,
the child shall remain in the then-current educational place-
ment... .,39Although the statute is not as explicit as some might
like, it is a matter of long-standing judicial interpretation that,
133. E.g., County Sch. Bd. v. RT, 433 F. Supp. 2d 692, 716 (E.D. Va. 2006) (holding
that, at least as a matter of state regulations, the school system must pay for the parents'
placement on a pendente lite basis).
134. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.515 (2009).
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., RT, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 696 & nn.4-5.
137. See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2006); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.518; Regulations Governing
Special Education Programs for Children with Disabilities in Virginia, 25 Va. Reg. Regs.
2872, 2947 (Apr. 13, 2009) (to be codified at 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-81-210(J)).
138. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 324 (1988) ("Congress ... provided for meaningful
parental participation in all aspects of a child's educational placement, and barred schools,
through the stay put provision, from changing that placement over the parent's objection
until all review proceedings were completed.") (discussing Education of All Handicapped
Children Act).
139. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2006) (emphasis added).
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when a hearing officer agrees with the parents' proposed change
of placement, his decision is treated as an agreement between the
state or locality and the parents for purposes § 1415(j). 140 This
means that the school system is obligated to pay for the costs of
the parents' proposed placement on an ongoing basis throughout
the course of any appeal the school system pursues.
Before the RT case arose, both federal and Virginia regulations
recognized these implications of the IDEA. 41 According to the fed-
eral regulation:
If the decision of a hearing officer in a due process hearing conducted
by the [State Education Agency] ... agrees with the child's parents
that a change of placement is appropriate, that placement must be
treated as an agreement between the State or local agency and the
parents for purposes of [the "stay put" provisions of the IDEA] .141
Virginia adopted a comparable provision:
If the decision of a hearing officer agrees with the child's parent or
parents that a change of placement is appropriate, that placement
shall be treated as an agreement between the local educational
agency and the parent or parents for the purposes of maintaining the
child's placement during the pendency of any administrative or judi-
cial appeal proceeding.
4
1
140. See, e.g., Sch. Comm. v. Dep't of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 372 (1985); Susquenita Sch.
Dist. v. Raelee S. ex rel. Heidi S., 96 F.3d 78, 84 (3d Cir. 1996); Clovis Unified Sch. Dist. v.
Cal. Office of Admin. Hearings, 903 F.2d 635, 641 (9th Cir. 1990).
141. The United States District Court decided County School Board v. RT on June 14,
2006. 433 F. Supp. 2d 692 (E.D. Va. 2006). Virginia finalized special education regulations
effective March 27, 2002, which included an agreement provision consonant with the judi-
cial interpretations described above. See Regulations Governing Special Education Pro-
grams for Children with Disabilities, 18 Va. Reg. Regs. 1657, 1676-77 (Feb. 25, 2002) (co-
dified at 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-80-76(E)(3) (2002)), repealed by 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 2872,
2947 (Apr. 13, 2009) (to be codified at 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-81-210(J)(3)). The federal
government promulgated similar regulations in 2004. See 34 C.F.R. § 300.514 (2004). No
substantive changes were made to these particular federal regulations when the Depart-
ment of Education amended other IDEA procedures. See 70 Fed. Reg. 35,809, 35,874 (June
21, 2005).
142. 34 C.F.R. § 300.514(c) (2004). Slightly revised in 2006, the regulation now reads:
If the hearing officer in a due process hearing conducted by the [state educa-
tion agency] or a State review official in an administrative appeal agrees with
the child's parents that a change of placement is appropriate, that placement
must be treated as an agreement between the State and the parents for pur-
poses [the "stay put" provisions of the IDEA].
34 C.F.R. § 300.519(d) (2009).
143. 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-80-76(E)(3) (2002) (repealed) (emphasis added). Effective
July 7, 2009, Virginia adopted new rules governing special education; however, no subs-
tantive changes occurred for the regulation at issue. See Regulations Governing Special
Education Programs for Children with Disabilities in Virginia, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 2872,
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Indeed, the Virginia regulations contained another provision, one
even more emphatic than the federal:
If the hearing officer's decision is appealed in court, implementation
of the hearing officer's order is held in abeyance except in those cases
where the hearing officer has agreed with the child's parent or par-
ents that a change in placement is appropriate .... In those cases,
the hearing officer's order must be implemented while the case is be-
ing appealed. 
144
Despite the clear direction of both federal and state law, some
staff members in the VDOE took the position that local school
systems need not comply. 5 The VDOE staff members based this
position on their reading of a 2003 federal court ruling in Prince
William County School Board v. Hallums.146 Such a reading of
Hallums was, however, strained at best.147 While Hallums denied
the parents reimbursement for private school expenses, most of
the district court's explanation for its decision dealt with the par-
ents' failure to give the school system the requisite notice. 14s The
Hallums court never addressed the regulations calling for pen-
dente lite relief."1 9 Yet, rightly or wrongly, soon after Hallums was
decided, VDOE staff began negating federal and state law by tell-
ing local school systems that they need not comply with the "stay
put" regulations that both governments had adopted. 150
2947 (Apr. 13, 2009) (to be codified at 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-81-210).
144. 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-80-76(0)(3) (2002) (repealed). The 2009 regulations do not
affect the substance of this provision. See 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 2872, 2953 (Apr. 13, 2009) (to
be codified at 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-81-210(T)(3)).
145. See RT, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 716-17 (discussing an affidavit from a VDOE staff
member on which the school board mistakenly relied and finding that, whatever interim
positions the staff of the VDOE had taken, the Department's official position is that com-
pliance with state regulations will be enforced).
146. Id. (noting Prince William County Sch. Bd. v. Hallums, No. 02-1005-A, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 27233 (E.D. Va. Aug. 12, 2003)).
147. Id. at 717.
148. Hallums, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27233, at *25-27.
149. Moreover, neither the United States Department of Education ("USDOE"), nor the
VDOE was a party to Hallums. While the decision of a federal court of appeals would es-
tablish the "law of the circuit," there is no such thing as "law of the district." E.g., In re
Executive Office of the President, 215 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) ("District Court deci-
sions do not establish the law of the circuit ... nor, indeed, do they even establish the law
of the district.") (citations omitted). The decision in Hallums bound the parties then before
the court, but no one else. Thus, it was difficult to see why the VDOE would use the case
to allow local school systems to escape the obligations owed parents under federal and
state law.
150. RT, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 716-17.
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The issue came to a head in 2006 in County School Board v.
RT, a case involving the Henrico County Public Schools ("HCPS")
and RT, a young boy with autism.15 ' In late 2003, a state hearing
officer ruled that the public school placement offered by HCPS
was inappropriate and that the private placement chosen by the
parents, the Faison School for Autism, was appropriate.5 2 Under
§ 1415(j) and its implementing regulations, HCPS was required to
fund the private placement during the pendency of any appeal
the school system might choose to pursue. 153 Yet, HCPS refused to
do so."5 Instead, it waited until almost a year later, then chal-
lenged the hearing officer's decision in federal court.' 5'
HCPS was aided in its resistance to the law-both before and
after the litigation began-by the VDOE, which had advised
HCPS that it was free to withhold payment of tuition while the
appeal was in progress and that the VDOE "could not compel the
payment of the tuition under the stay-put provision of the state
regulations." 56 In support of its argument, HCPS brought to court
an affidavit from a high-ranking VDOE employee. 57 As the litiga-
tion progressed, however, HCPS's reliance on the VDOE col-
lapsed. The court explained:
As briefing progressed in this case, and as the position of the School
Board and the existence of [the VDOE employee's] affidavit became
known in the State and federal departments of education, it became
obvious that [her] affidavit was neither authorized by, nor was the
position of, the State Department of Education. To the contrary, the
record clarified that, whatever interim positions the staff of the State
Department of Education had taken based on their strained inter-
pretation of the Hallums decision, the official position of the State
Department of Education is that 8 VAC 20-80-76(E)(3) is valid and is
being enforced by the State Department of Education."'
With its ally at VDOE having been overruled by her superiors
in the agency and by the Office of the Virginia Attorney Gener-
al,",9 HCPS tried a new tactic by arguing that the federal regula-
151. Id. at 695.
152. Id. at 696.
153. Id. at 696, 715-16.
154. Id. at 697.
155. Id. at 696.
156. Id. at 716.
157. See id.
158. Id. at 717 (footnotes omitted).
159. See id. at 717 & n.42.
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tion was invalid, basing a Spending Clause argument on the al-
leged absence of statutory clarity."' HCPS also argued that the
state regulation must be ignored because it was adopted by the
State Board of Education under the mistaken belief that the fed-
eral regulation was valid.1"' Furthermore, the School Board ar-
gued that the First Circuit's opinion in Town of Burlington v. De-
partment of Education"2 precluded enforcement of the state
regulations, in that the doctrine of "cooperative federalism" forec-
losed a claim under state regulations. "'63
The district court found a number of flaws with this approach,
including the belatedness with which the argument was raised.
Not stopping there, however, the court went on to explain that,
even if the federal regulation exceeded what was permitted under
a Spending Clause analysis (a question not reached), the validity
of the state regulation would not be affected because the IDEA
"permits a State to impose regulations more stringent than the
parallel federal regulations." 165 Finding that it had jurisdiction to
consider a pendent state law claim, the court said "the State regu-
lations are in full force and effect and, by their clear terms, the
School Board is obligated to fund the Faison placement for RT
during the period of judicial review of the State Hearing Officer's
decision. "166
Following RT, VDOE staff ceased advising local school districts
that they could disregard their pendente lite obligations under
federal and state law. 167 Indeed, when Virginia adopted new spe-
cial education regulations, effective July 7, 2009, those revised
regulations contained virtually the same provisions that the fed-
eral court cited when it decided RT in favor of the parents. 6 Epi-
sodes where a school system disregards the "stay put" require-
160. Id. at 715.
161. See id. at 716.
162. 736 F.2d 773 (lst Cir, 1984).
163. RT, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 717.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 718.
167. This is in accordance with the holding of the court in County School Board v. RT.
Id. at 718.
168. Compare Regulations Governing Special Education Programs for Children with
Disabilities in Virginia, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 2872, 2947, 2953 (Apr. 13, 2009) (codified at 8
VA. ADMIN. CODE §§ 20-81-210(J)(3), 20-81-210(T)(3) (2009)), with 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE §§
20-80-76(E)(3), 20-80-76(O)(3) (2002) (repealed).
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ments of the law, such as the one endured by RT and his family,
are not likely to arise again.
VII. WHAT RULES GOVERN THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
IN IDEA CASES?
It is a familiar principle of law that a civil claim must be
brought within a limitations period-typically defined by sta-
tute-or else the claim will be forever barred.169 Claims brought
under the IDEA are no exception, and the limitations period in
Virginia has long been set at two years.170 Originally, this was the
result of court decisions that "borrowed" from a Virginia sta-
tute;17' however, the two-year limitation period was explicitly
written into federal law as part of the IDEA amendments that
took effect on July 1, 2005.172 The IDEA now provides:
A parent or agency shall request an impartial due process hearing
within 2 years of the date the parent or agency knew or should have
known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the com-
plaint, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation for requesting
such a hearing under this subchapter, in such time as the State law
allows.
173
169. See, e.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (defining "statute of limita-
tions").
170. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
171. See, e.g., Manning ex rel. Manning v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 176 F.3d 235, 238
(4th Cir. 1999) (explaining that in the absence of a specific federal statute of limitations
for IDEA claims, the court will look to the most analogous Virginia statute and selecting
Virginia Code section 8.01-248); see also Schimmel ex rel. Schimmel v. Spillane, 819 F.2d
477, 482-83 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S.
226, 240 (1985) (same)).
172. Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
446, § 1415(f)(3)(C), 118 Stat. 2647, 2722 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §
1415(f)(3)(C) (2006)).
173. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C). It should be mentioned that the IDEA also provides ex-
ceptions to the two-year limitation period:
The timeline described in subparagraph (C) shall not apply to a parent if the
parent was prevented from requesting the hearing due to-
(i) specific misrepresentations by the local educational agency that it
had resolved the problem forming the basis of the complaint; or
(ii) the local educational agency's withholding of information from
the parent that was required under this subchapter to be provided to
the parent.
Id. § 1415(f)(3)(D). The same 2005 IDEA amendments adopted a very short time frame for
seeking judicial review of an unfavorable hearing officer decision. Under the new provi-
sions: "The party bringing the action shall have 90 days from the date of the decision of
the hearing officer to bring such an action, or, if the State has an explicit time limitation
for bringing such action under this subchapter in such time as the State law allows." Id. §
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Yet, to specify the length of the limitations period does not ad-
dress all relevant issues. It is also necessary to determine precise-
ly when the two-year clock begins to run. To say that it begins to
run from "the date the parent or agency knew or should have
known about the alleged action that forms the basis of the com-
plaint " 114 raises as many questions as it answers. Moreover, it is
necessary to determine the circumstances under which the run-
ning of time is tolled, i.e., suspended.
A. Starting the Clock
In R.R. ex rel. R. v. Fairfax County School Board, the Fourth
Circuit used language very similar to what was later adopted by
Congress in the July 1, 2005 amendments. 7 , The court held that
a claim under the IDEA accrues "when the parents know of the
injury or the event that is the basis for their claim."176 The court
then identified two possible instances when a cause of action
could be deemed to accrue. One possibility was when a parent "re-
ject[s] the proposed IEP as inadequate," while another was when
the parent withdraws the student "from the public school system
because it [is] at that time that [the student is] entitled to initiate
1415(i)(2)(B). The new language took effect on July 1, 2005, and for four years, the VDOE
took the position that Virginia had just such an explicit time limitation, based on a 2002
VDOE regulation, which stated: "A decision by the hearing officer in any hearing, includ-
ing an expedited hearing, shall be final and binding unless the decision is appealed by a
party in a state circuit court within one year of the issuance of the decision or in a federal
district court." 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-80-76(O)(1) (2002) (emphasis added). By naming a
one-year limitations period for filing a complaint in state court, but specifying no limita-
tions period for filing a complaint in federal court, the 2002 regulation left the federal re-
medy to whatever limitations period other law might supply. Thus, after the new ninety-
day federal language went into effect, Virginia hearing officer decisions typically provided
that "[a] decision is final and binding unless either party appeals in a federal district court
within 90 calendar days of the date of the decision, or in a state circuit court within one
year of the date of the decision." See VDOE Dispute Resolution and Administrative Servic-
es Hearing Officer Decisions, http://www.doe.virginia.gov/VDOE/dueproc/HearingOfficer
Decisions/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2009) [hereinafter VDOE Dispute Resolution].
Effective July 7, 2009, however, Virginia has in place a new regulation that mirrors the
federal law by requiring that complaints in state court also be filed within ninety days
from the date of the hearing officer's decision. The regulation states in pertinent part: "A
decision by the special education hearing officer in any hearing ... is final and binding
unless the decision is appealed by a party in a state circuit court or a federal district court
within 90 days of the issuance of the decision." Regulations Governing Special Education
Programs for Children with Disabilities in Virginia, 25 Va. Reg. Regs. 2872, 2953 (Apr. 13,
2009) (to be codified at 8 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 20-81-210(T)(1)).
174. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C).
175. Compare 338 F.3d 325, 332-33 (4th Cir. 2003), with 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b)(6)(B).
176. Id. at 332 (citation omitted).
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a due process hearing or an administrative appeal."177 However,
because the two-year statutory limitations period had expired for
R.R. under either approach, the court was able to decide the case
without deciding which approach is correct.178
Arguably, the suggestion that one of the two named options
applies was dictum. Certainly there are other possibilities, not
mentioned by the court, which would have caused the time to run
out before the claim was filed in R.R., and which might be used in
a future case as the accrual date for a cause of action. One such
possibility would be when the objectionable IEP is initially pro-
posed. Another possibility would be when the school year covered
by the proposed IEP actually begins, on the theory that the start
of school is when the school system is required to have an appro-
priate IEP in place.179 Still another possibility might be when the
student begins to receive private services, on the theory that
there could be no reimbursement claim before there were actual
expenses to reimburse.
While the Fourth Circuit has not decided the issue definitively,
one federal district court and several hearing officers in Virginia
have addressed the question of when an IDEA claim accrues. 10
While the federal court discussed only the two options expressly
recognized by the Fourth Circuit in R.R., several hearing officers
have recognized an even earlier accrual date.
1. M.S. v. Fairfax County School Board
In M.S. v. Fairfax County School Board, the court stated that
"a claim based on a denial of a FAPE accrues when a parent re-
jects a proposed IEP as inadequate or withdraws a child from
school."' , Having recognized that the Fourth Circuit named these
two possible accrual dates, the court in M.S. went on to say that
"[p]laintiffs' claims based on FAPE denial therefore accrued, at
the latest, on ... the date when they rejected the proposed ninth
177. Id. at 333.
178. Id.
179. See 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(2)(A) ("At the beginning of each school year, [the school
system] shall have in effect, for each child with a disability in the agency's jurisdiction, an
individualized education program . .
180. See infra Parts VII.A.1.-2.
181. No. 1:05cv1476(JCC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 53323, at *15 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20,
2006) (citing R.R., 338 F.3d at 332-33) (emphasis added).
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grade IEP." 1s' The court's syllogism would seem to imply that, in
its view, the two choices named by R.R. comprise an exhaustive
list of possible accrual dates. However, the court was not forced to
choose between them because, in either event, the request for a
due process hearing was timely filed.
2. Administrative Hearings18 3
In [Unnamed] Student v. [Unnamed] Public Schools I, the
hearing officer held that the creation of the allegedly improper
IEP, rather than the date of the parents' rejection of the IEP, was
the starting point for purposes of determining the running of the
statute of limitations.11 On that basis, the parents' claim was
dismissed. 185
In [Unnamed] Student v. [Unnamed] Public Schools II, the
hearing officer expressly rejected the parents' contention that the
accrual date should have been when the IEP was rejected or
when the parents withdrew the student from the public school
based on alleged flaws in the IEP.186 The hearing officer held the
claim accrued earlier than the signing of the IEP because the
parents' request for due process delineated past shortcomings by
the school district, and it was the occurrence of these shortcom-
ings that actually triggered the running of the statute of limita-
tions.8 7
In [Unnamed] Student v. [Unnamed] Public Schools III, the
parents alleged that a previous hearing officer, who later recused
himself, had determined that the operative date for accrual of the
cause of action was the date of the student's admission applica-
182. Id.
183. Although VDOE publishes hearing officer decisions on its website, it does so only
after redacting the name of the student and often, though not always, redacting the name
of the school district. Thus, these cases can best be identified by reference to their case
number and date. See VDOE Dispute Resolution supra, note 173. In light of this, the fol-
lowing adjudications are assigned roman numerals to delineate.
184. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of Educ., Case No. 08-023, Due Process Hearing Or-
der of Dismissal, at 4 (Nov. 2, 2007), available at http://www.doe.virginia.gov/VDOE/due
proc/HearingOfficerDecisions/HOD-08-023.pdf.
185. Id. at 6.
186. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of Educ., Case No. 09-013, Public School Motion to
Dismiss Decision, at 9 (Sept. 17, 2008), available at http://www.doe.virginia.gov/VDOE/due
proc/HearingOfficerDecisionsHOD-09-013.pdf.
187. Id. at 8-9.
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tion and diagnostic assessment at the private school.lss The
second hearing officer who took the case disagreed and held that
the date of accrual was when the allegedly faulty IEP was
created.189
While none of these hearing officer decisions were appealed,
the discrepancy between the accrual dates they cite and the po-
tential accrual dates noted in R.R. could easily provoke further
litigation in a future case.
B. Tolling
It is a well-recognized principle that, even when a cause of ac-
tion has accrued, a limitations period will not begin to run
against a minor until he attains the age of majority or is other-
wise emancipated. 190 Thus, if a minor receives a serious bodily in-
jury when he is a newborn (a tort that carries a two-year limita-
tions period), he will have until his twentieth birthday to file suit
against his tortfeasor, thus preserving his claim for twenty
years. 9' Whether a minor's IDEA claims are similarly preserved
by tolling until he attains his majority is an issue that has been
bubbling beneath the surface-and sometimes erupting--over the
past few years in Virginia. This should be an issue of particular
concern to school systems because their obligation to provide spe-
cial education services can begin as early as a child's second
birthday.9 2 If the child's IDEA claims are preserved by tolling,
then the school system could theoretically be sued for failure to
provide FAPE until the child's twentieth birthday-a period of
eighteen years. Indeed, by invoking the "minority tolling" doc-
trine, a young adult could conceivably claim that the entire
course of his public school education constituted a denial of
188. Commonwealth of Va. Dep't of Educ., Case No. 06-068, Due Process Hearing, at 2,
5 (Oct. 10, 2006), available at http://www.doe.virginia.gov/VDOE/dueproc/HearingOfficer
Decisions/HOD-06-068.pdf.
189. Id. at 21.
190. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(A)(2)(a) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009).
191. See, e.g., Perez ex rel. Perez v. Espinola, 749 F. Supp. 732, 734 & n.3 (E.D. Va.
1990) (although mother's claim was time-barred, court noted that infant's claim was not
barred until age of majority plus length of statute of limitations).
192. See VA. CODE ANN. § 22.1-213 (Repl. Vol. 2006); id. § 22.1-214(A) (Cum. Supp.
2009).
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FAPE, thus entitling him to a very substantial remedy if he were
to prevail. 19 3
In Virginia, such a nightmarish result for school systems is
largely precluded-though not entirely eliminated-by the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Sellers ex rel. Sellers v. School Board,
in which the court held that monetary damages are not available
for violation of the IDEA. 194 Relief under the IDEA is almost en-
tirely prospective, rather than retrospective: generally speaking,
a successful litigant can obtain FAPE moving forward but cannot
obtain relief for past deprivations.195
However, there are two exceptions to this approach. First,
courts are authorized to award reimbursement for the expenses of
a private educational placement in certain circumstances.'96 It
should go without saying that the costs of a private educational
placement can be quite high. 197 Second, courts may also award
"compensatory education," which is defined as "educational ser-
vices ordered by the court to be provided prospectively to compen-
sate for a past deficient program."98 While compensatory educa-
tion seems to involve services rather than monetary payment,
providing appropriate services to an adult can be expensive as
well.199
With respect to reimbursement, school systems obtained signif-
icant protection against the minority tolling doctrine in Emery v.
Roanoke County School Board.20 0 In Emery, a nine-year-old boy
suffered a traumatic brain injury in 1991 and did not leave the
hospital until late September of that year.20 1 Given the student's
193. School systems may retort that because the statute of limitations in the IDEA is
cast in terms of when the "parent... knew or should have known about the alleged action
that forms the basis of the complaint," 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(C) (2006) (emphasis added),
the statute implicitly runs against the child as well. It seems unlikely, however, that
courts will discard a doctrine as well entrenched in the law as the minority tolling doctrine
based on a less-than-explicit statement of congressional intent.
194. 141 F.3d 524, 526-28 (4th Cir. 1998).
195. See id. at 527 (stating retroactive awards of damages are inconsistent with the
structure of the IDEA).
196. See id.
197. See, e.g., Emery v. Roanoke City Sch. Bd., 432 F.3d 294, 296 (4th Cir. 2005) (refer-
ring to private placement costs of over $200,000 incurred in six months).
198. G ex rel. RG v. Fort Bragg Dependent Schs., 343 F.3d 295, 308 (4th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis added).
199. See, e.g., id. at 301 (referring to costs of more than $30,000 for home therapy).
200. See 432 F.3d 294.
201. Id. at 296.
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disabilities, the school system provided him with an IEP for the
1991-92 school year, first placing him in a public program and
later in a private program at public expense. 20 2 The situation con-
tinued to deteriorate, and at the end of the 1991-92 school year,
the private program expelled the student for behavior issues.20 3
The school system prepared no IEP for the following school
year. 204 Instead, the school system allegedly told the father that
"he would have to find his son a placement on his own."20 5 The fa-
ther placed the student at a private facility for the bulk of the
1992-93 school year and paid for the placement with his own
funds and insurance proceeds.206 It was the cost of the 1992-93
private placement that later became the subject of a due process
hearing; however, years passed before any claim was filed.207
Then, sometime after the fall of 1999, the student filed for a due
process hearing.208
There was little question that the school district failed to pro-
vide an IEP during the 1992-93 school year, but the court held
that the district court properly dismissed the student's reim-
bursement request. 20 9 In so ruling, the court focused not on the
minority tolling doctrine, but on the question of standing.210 The
court reasoned that any claim for reimbursement was the father's
not the student's because it was the father's insurance that had
paid for student's education. 211 Yet the student, not the father,
was the plaintiff in the case.212 Moreover, the court observed that
the father's cause of action was long expired, though it again
avoided addressing when the cause of action actually began to
run:
[Tihe [father's] cause of action... accrued, at the very latest, on June
2, 1993, at which point [the student] had completed his time [in the
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 296-97.
208. See id. at 297.
209. See id. at 296, 298.
210. See id. at 298-300.
211. Id. at 299-300.
212. Id. at 296.
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private institution] without an IEP. The applicable statute of limita-
tions gave his parents one year from this date [now two years] to re-
quest a due process hearing.
1 3
School systems are, however, not out of the woods entirely.
While monetary damages are not available under the IDEA, such
relief is available for violations of the Americans with Disabilities
Act ("ADA") and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.21 4 Moreover, at
least one court has expressly held that the minority tolling doc-
trine applies to ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims.21 5 Even under
the IDEA, circumstances may be envisioned in which-unlike
Emery-payment for years of private placement came from funds
belonging to the child, thus entitling the child to reimburse-
ment.
216
With respect to compensatory education, there appear to be no
reported cases in Virginia where an adult has sought services for
the denial of FAPE and where the minority tolling doctrine was
implicated. Indeed, there is a dearth of court cases involving
compensatory education, 217  making this a potentially fertile
ground for future litigation.
213. Id. at 300 n.2 (emphasis added). Virginia's "catch-all" statute of limitations was
amended to provide for a two-year limitations period for claims "accruing on or after July
1, 1995." VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2009). Because the fa-
ther's claim in Emery accrued before that date, it was governed by the old, one-year sta-
tute. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-248 (Repl. Vol. 1992). By holding out the possibility that
the cause of action did not arise until the end of the school year, Emery lends credence to
the view that the decision in R.R. was not intended to constitute an exhaustive list of poss-
ible accrual dates, at least where no JEP is proposed. See R.R. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd.,
338 F.3d 325, 332-33 (4th Cir. 2003).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2006); 29 U.S.C. § 794a (2006).
215. M.S. v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., No. 1:05cv1476 (JCC), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
53323, at *16 (E.D. Va. Mar. 20, 2006).
216. One example expressly recognized by the Emery court would be where "the ex-
penses paid to the private school through [the student's] insurance plan diminished the
amount of future benefits she could receive from it." 432 F.3d at 300 (distinguishing the
facts of Emery from Shook ex rel. Shook v. Gaston County Bd. of Educ., 882 F.2d 119, 122-
23 (4th Cir. 1989)).
217. But see Hogan v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., No. 1:08cv250 (JCC), 2009 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 67773, at *50 (E.D. Va. Aug. 3, 2009) (awarding eight weeks of compensatory edu-
cation plus partial reimbursement for tuition where school system failed to provide an IEP
for an entire school year and where father used private educational services for a portion
of the year).
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VIII. WHEN MAY PARENTS OBTAIN PUBLIC PAYMENT FOR A
PRIVATE PLACEMENT?21s
It has long been the law that, under certain circumstances,
parents may require a school system to pay for the costs of pri-
vate education for a child with disabilities. The issue arose in
School Committee of Burlington v. Massachusetts Department of
Education, which held that a court may order such payment as
part of its statutory authorization to "grant such relief as the
court determines is appropriate." 219
Several years later, in 1997, Congress adopted amendments to
the IDEA.220 Among those amendments was a provision which,
depending on one's point of view, merely codified Burlington or
else limited the ability of courts to award reimbursement for a
private placement. Under the latest version of this provision, if
the child has
previously received special education and related services under the
authority of a public agency... a court or a hearing officer may re-
quire the agency to reimburse the parents for the cost of [private
school] enrollment if the court or hearing officer finds that the agen-
cy had not made a free appropriate public education available.
2 1
In Forest Grove School District v. T.A., after the school district
found the student in question ineligible for special education un-
der the IDEA and refused to provide an IEP, his parents removed
him from the public school and placed him in a private acade-
my. 222 A hearing officer found the child eligible for special educa-
tion and awarded the parents reimbursement for private school
tuition; however, the district court set aside the award. 2 13 Reading
the 1997 amendment as a limitation on its authority, the district
court held that the IDEA prohibited reimbursement unless a stu-
dent has "previously received special education and related ser-
218. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 2484, 2488 (2009) (holding
that a child need not have received special education or related services from a public
school system in order to be eligible for public payment for a private placement).
219. 471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985) (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006) (previously
20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2))).
220. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-17, 111 Stat. 37 (1998) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006)).
221. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006) (emphasis added).
222. 557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2488-89.
223. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2489.
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vices under the [school's] authority."224 The Ninth Circuit re-
versed, holding that courts could still grant reimbursement de-
spite a lack of previous services. 225
The Supreme Court "granted certiorari to determine whether §
1412(a)(10)(C) establishes a categorical bar to tuition reimburse-
ment for students who have not previously received special-
education services under the authority of a public education
agency. "226 In deciding the question, the Court held that its pre-
vious decisions in Burlington, and Florence County School Disrict
Four v. Carter221 controlled the outcome.228 Although based on an
earlier version of the IDEA, Burlington and Carter made clear
that under the IDEA a court has the authority to "grant such re-
lief as the court determines is appropriate. '' 229 This "grant of au-
thority includes 'the power to order school authorities to reim-
burse parents for their expenditures on private special-education
[sic] services if the court ultimately determines that such place-
ment, rather than a proposed IEP, is proper under the Act.' 230
The Court held that the 1997 amendments to the IDEA did not
abrogate this broad grant of authority because those amendments
"do not expressly prohibit reimbursement under the circums-
tances of this case, and the District offers no evidence that Con-
gress intended to supersede . .. Burlington and Carter."231 Fur-
thermore, the school district's interpretation was inconsistent
with the IDEA's purpose of "ensur[ing] that all children with dis-
abilities have available to them a [FAPE] that emphasizes special
education. . . designed to meet their unique needs ,' 32 and it
would have the irrational result of providing a remedy to stu-
dents whose public schools offer inadequate special education
224. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., No. CV 04-331-MO, 2005 WL 6331233, at *11 (D.
Or. May 11, 2005).
225. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2008).
226. Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2490. The Court had granted certiorari
to address this same question in an earlier case; however, Justice Kennedy recused him-
self from that case, and the judgment of the Second Circuit ruling in favor of the parents
was affirmed without opinion by an equally divided vote. See Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F., 552
U.S. 1 (2007) (per curiam).
227. 510 U.S. 7 (1993).
228. Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2496.
229. Id. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 2490 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) (2006)).
230. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2491 (quoting Sch. Comm. of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ.,
471 U.S. 359, 369 (1985)).
231. Id. at , 129 S. Ct. at 2492.
232. Id. at _, 129 S. Ct. at 2494 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A)).
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services while refusing a remedy to students whose schools deny
access to such services altogether.
Of course, parents who seek reimbursement for a private
placement still must show "that the public placement violated
IDEA and the private school placement was proper under the
Act."233 "And even then courts retain discretion to reduce the
amount of a reimbursement award if the equities so warrant-for
instance, if the parents failed to give the school district adequate
notice of their intent to enroll the child in private school."234 What
is key about Forest Grove is that the Supreme Court reaffirmed
the plenary equity powers granted to courts under the IDEA to
provide any and all "appropriate" relief to children and parents
denied a FAPE by public schools, and it confirmed that such pow-
ers remain available to courts under the current version of the
IDEA.
IX. CONCLUSION
Recent years have produced a mixed collection of legal prece-
dents in the special education arena. Parents have won cases giv-
ing them the right to appear in court without an attorney. They
have also won the right to demand more specificity in the IEPs
proposed by school systems, as well as the right to obtain public
payment for a private placement, in certain cases, without first
having to receive services from the public school system. In a
hard fought contest, they have forced public school systems-and
the VDOE-to abide by the "stay put" provisions of federal and
state law.
School systems have won important decisions as well. These
cases have established a rule that parents are not entitled to
compensation for their expert witness expenses, even when the
parents prevail. Schools won the burden of proof issue. By impos-
ing the burden on the party seeking the due process hearing, the
burden is now, as a practical matter, almost always imposed on
the parents. The statute of limitations, while still subject to fu-
ture litigation, has been used by some hearing officers to foreclose
233. Id. at __, 129 S. Ct. at 2496 (citing Florence County Sch. Dist. v. Carter, 510 U.S.
7, 15 (1993)).
234. Id.
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parents' claims sooner than one might have expected based on a
reading of Fourth Circuit case law.
The playing field, while not level, is one on which hardier par-
ents can compete. With good facts, good representation, and per-
haps a bit of good luck, parents can prevail against school sys-
tems that fail to offer the free appropriate public education
envisioned by Congress when it enacted the IDEA's predecessor
thirty-five years ago.
